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permitted to enter. The order was originally issued to protect German fruit against infection from the San Jose louse carried in by American fruit, and not in retaliation, as was charged.

... At a banquet at Madrid on February 25th to Señor Bernabe, the new Spanish minister to Washington, our Ambassador, General Woodford, spoke in the strongest terms for peace between the two countries. His words produced a strong revulsion of feeling among the Spanish in favor of America.

## The Annexation of Hawaii.

BY PROFESSOR H. E. VON HOLST, PH.D.

Address delivered before the Commercial Club of Chicago,  
Jan. 29, 1898.

That the Sandwich Islands are one of the fairest spots on God's earth, and of considerable economical value, nobody gainsays. I, however, hold myself justified in passing by this side of the question, for the simple reason that all the economical advantages to be derived from them can be secured without annexation, nay, are secured already. That the future will change nothing in this respect against the will of the United States is certain, because the immutable facts of the case render it palpably and eminently the interest of the islands to maintain the established economic relation with this country.

The second reason adduced for annexation is the alleged great value of the islands from a military point of view. Some weeks ago, I was triumphantly told that, as to this, all our naval officers are agreed, and I raised great laughter at my expense by replying that I could by no means recognize our naval officers as an authority whose *ipse dixit* settles this question. At the risk of meeting here with the same fate, I repeat this declaration. *A priori*, our naval officers cannot be considered wholly impartial witnesses. It is to be presumed that they will be more or less biased in favor of whatever tends to increase the import of their vocation. This is no reproach, but simply saying that even our naval officers are heirs to human nature. Does the past history of mankind not warrant the statement that the military have been fully as prone as other mortals to view public problems through the medium of their class-interest? Besides, it will have to be admitted to be at least a possibility that the perspective of military men may be marred by taking a somewhat one-sided, what I should call a too technical view of it. Into military questions of this character largely enter factors which common sense is fully capable of judging correctly. And, finally, I do not hesitate to venture the assertion, though it may expose me to the charge of egotism and arrogance—in military questions of this character, also, historians can lay some claim to speaking as experts. It goes without saying, that this does not extend to tactical and strategic questions, partaking of a strictly technical character and requiring a knowledge of practical details. But if they have studied the military history of the world with open eyes, they must be perfectly familiar with and competent to judge of the general facts and causes on which military strength or weakness necessarily depends. In this re-

spect, an able historian even holds vantage ground over the majority of military men. If these are not also, to some extent, historians, with a dash of statesmanship in their intellectual makeup, their very mastery of the more technical sides of their profession can easily become a film over their eyes as to these general facts and causes. The historian, lacking this kind of knowledge, can only take a bird's-eye view, and that does not offer such obstruction.

Let us, however, grant, for a moment, that the military value of the islands is all our naval men claim. Ought that to determine us, in case military objections to annexation must be admitted to exist in other respects? I think clearly not, because I confidently defy any one to successfully refute the assertion that we can never have a war unless it be of our own seeking, and, therefore, the advantage would be merely a fictitious gain, so long as we do not put it to improper and harmful use. So long as we do not demand of other nations more than is justly our due, and do not force them to the alternative of drawing their sword or letting their honor be trampled upon, they, without a single exception, will never appeal to the *ultima ratio*. The reason is neither that they love us so much, nor that they stand in such awe of our military resources, but simply that they are not idiots. Unless their potentates and ministers are idiots, they cannot fail to see that, in the given and unalterable condition of things, even a successful war would be to them absolutely barren of any advantages, and that even the most successful war would impose upon themselves incalculable sacrifices. A cession of territory is out of the question, for territory of the United States—with the exception of uncoveted Alaska—being compact and extending over half a continent, the ceded strip of land would be simply an earnest of eternally renewed wars till it was regained; and the Franco-German war of 1870-71 has forever settled the question that the greatest war indemnity which can possibly be imposed upon a vanquished country, falls far short of the expenses of the victorious nation. For these reasons, the United States are the one nation on earth whose peace is wholly in its own hands.

That we can, nevertheless, sooner or later be involved in a war, is unfortunately only too true. Therefore, it is proper to compare our actual condition with what it will be after annexation.

Our Western coast, say the annexationists, is dangerously exposed; the way to it will be most effectively blocked to every enemy if Hawaii is ours, for the hold of no man-of-war is big enough to steam from Asia to Australia over the vast Pacific without recoaling, and that can be done only at Hawaii. It must be conceded that there is some truth in this, but if we look a little closer we will become satisfied that, after all, it does by far not amount to as much as it would seem at first sight. And just as to that power with which we are the likeliest to clash, and whose navy is equal to the combined naval forces of any other two powers, it is of the least consequence. John Bull is still so large a land-holder on the Western coast of America that he need not defer striking a blow at us on the Pacific till he has got his war-ships over from Asia and Australia. As to all other powers, we would only gain some time by this coaling question, valuable, indeed, but by no means of decisive import. There is no means of effectively protecting our shipping but by an adequate navy, and our seaports can be suc-

cessfully defended only by efficient coast defenses. As to the creation of such a navy and such coast defenses, the possession or non-possession of Hawaii is, however, of no relevancy, and, in point of time, it requires not weeks or months, but years.

In itself, Hawaii is of no military value whatever. This assertion is fully endorsed by Captain Mahan, who is usually considered our leading naval authority. He writes: "Military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, do not by themselves confer control. People often say that such an island or harbor will give control to such a body of water. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake." When we have an adequate navy, then, but only then, Hawaii will indeed constitute a *point d'appui* of no mean value in its operations for the protection of our shipping in the Pacific. This is true, but it is only half the truth. The reverse of the medal is, that to be adequate, our navy would have to be considerably larger, if Hawaii is ours, than if it is not ours. The reason is that we would need a navy large enough to protect not only our shipping and our coasts, but also Hawaii. If we make it a formidable military stronghold, as we must do according to the annexationists, any first-class naval power is likely, in case of war, to make it a principal object of attack, because, being at such a great distance from our real seat of power, its defense will be difficult, and necessitate the withdrawing of a large part of our naval forces from other points, thereby exposing us there to telling blows, more especially affecting us economically. That we would much rather suffer these than risk anything as to Hawaii, admits of no doubt. For then we would not think of it only as a strategic point. We would consider our honor engaged, and rather than yield as to this point of honor, we would submit to any sacrifices in money and in blood. This being so, we are justified in feeling perfectly sure that, if we conclude to take possession of Hawaii, we shall always be able to keep possession of it. That we *can* do it, is, however, no proof that we *ought* to put ourselves under the necessity of doing it. *Ought* we to consider the game worth the candle? We are now, in a sense, practically invulnerable. The reasons are so obvious that I cannot spare the time to elucidate them. Ought we, without any need, to acquire a spot at which an enemy can hit us infinitely harder than anywhere else? If the mother of Achilles had had forethought enough to bring the whole body of her baby into contact with the water of the Styx, would the hero have eagerly snatched at the proffered gift of a heel, which would not be impentetrable to the arrow of Paris? That is what we are invited to do. The expense involved in rendering Hawaii a formidable military stronghold is comparatively of no moment. The decisive point, as to the military side of the question, is that, what at first sight seems to be a source of strength will, by directly and indirectly acting as a drain upon our force, ultimately prove to be a source of weakness. When we come to realize that, it will be too late. Other mistakes we can correct. This would be a step that could not be retraced, and it is this that renders the issue of such tremendous import. Not only during a war, but always public sentiment would see "honor" as an insurmountable obstacle in the way. To make the best of a bad job, would be all that was left to us.

I said, a minute ago, very deliberately, we would bur-

den ourselves with it without any need. That this assertion meets only with derision and indignation on the part of the annexationists I know full well. Some of them believe, and all of them try to make us believe, that we act, in a way, under compulsion, because if we do not take Hawaii, most certainly some other power will—probably England. For proofs, we ask in vain. The question why some other power, especially England, did not take it long ago, although the natives could never have offered any resistance worth speaking of, remains unanswered. That the same cry has been raised every time we were after some territory; that it has never been substantiated; that it was most drastically disproved in the case of St. Thomas by England's not offering a shilling for this "breeding place of earthquakes and hurricanes" when we had failed to buy it, and in the case of San Domingo—it is all of no avail. The cry has hardly ever failed to have the desired effect. Small wonder, therefore, that we hear it now. But I ask: Has not the time come, at last, when we can afford to think high enough of our power as well as of our dignity, not to let the cry "England!" have the effect upon us that the red cloth has upon the bull?

Nor do I stop there. I can serve the annexationists with an answer to the question why—if their assertion be true that Hawaii is coveted by other nations—it has not been grabbed long ago. Simply because all the world knew that the United States would not be an indifferent looker-on. Ever since 1825, when, measured by the standard of their present power the United States were a mere stripling, the notification—given, by the way, not only to the European but also to the other American states (Mexico and Columbia. See my Constitutional History of the United States, I., 428-430.)—that they would not "allow" and "permit" Cuba to pass into the hands of any other power, has sufficed to prevent the materializing of the projects entertained in different quarters with regard to the pearl of the Antilles. And about thirty years ago, though they had but just emerged from the most gigantic civil war history knows of, their pronouncing, without any blustering, but very firmly, the two words "we object," sufficed to make the French clear out of Mexico. Is it, then, not a moral certainty that their categorical "hands off!" would now be respected? It surely bespeaks neither levity nor presumption to assume that what more than half a century ago was justly deemed a sufficient curb upon the supposed covetousness of the great European powers will not now prove too weak a bit upon Japan, the new bug-bear with which the annexationists try to scare us into annexation.

This disposes also of an argument I heard the other day advanced by a distinguished Hawaiian. If I understood the gentleman correctly, his declaration was to this effect: If the United States do not accede to our request, dissensions are sure to break out among the ruling elements of the islands, resulting in eternal intrigues with other powers, which it will be impossible to terminate in any other way than by bringing about annexation by one of them. It won't take the islanders long to come to the conclusion that this is not the way to set their affairs to rights, because the warning given by the United States to all other powers will have stopped their ears to such solicitations.

The objection that the islands are a sovereign state, and that we have no right to interpose our veto to their

merging themselves into any other sovereignty—more especially after having refused to take them ourselves—does not hold water. It is exactly the same right the United States exercised in regard to the Cuban and Mexican question: the right to shape their international policy according to their interests, and to declare in advance what this policy will be in certain contingencies. If this policy runs counter to the supposed interests of some other state, it is perfectly free, at its own risk, to defy this policy. In this case, the ruling classes of the islands have, moreover, only to blame themselves, if this puts them into a position they do not like. They would have no right to complain, if we were to dismiss their lamentations over the dire consequences they declare to apprehend with the cold comfort to be derived from the homely saying: You have to eat the soup you have chosen to cook for yourselves. But I honestly believe they have no reason to lose heart. The docility of the bulk of the population, combined with the moral backing they are sure always to receive from the United States, because the American people consider their own interests in a measure involved in the problem, is a guaranty that it will be possible to devise other ways to secure all that is really essential to the welfare of the islands.

My last assertions seem to me so incontrovertible that I think even all candid annexationists could not help endorsing them, though ever so reluctantly, if it were not for one fact: the annexation of Hawaii does not mean the annexing merely of Hawaii. If there be one prayer surpassing in practical wisdom and importance all others, for nations no less than for individuals, it is this: Lead us not into temptation. With Hawaii, however, we would annex temptation, and it is chiefly because of this that annexation is so enthusiastically urged and so strenuously insisted upon. Undoubtedly the annexationists want to get Hawaii for its own sake; but they infinitely more want it as a stepping stone, an opening, a new departure in the general character of our international policy. And they are only too right in assuming that, if they prevail now, the question will no longer be whether, but only how fast the nation will yield to the temptation. This is no baseless charge. It is daily avowed in a hundred different ways.

I do not mean to assert that the bulk of the annexationists of to-day are already now consciously driving at further annexations. On the contrary, I believe that the ardor of the majority of them would be considerably cooled if they could be made to realize how likely this annexation is to lead to the annexation of other outlying territory. I confess it is a rather bold assumption, that they do not realize it, for it is so palpable that it requires almost an effort not to see it. The question of the annexation of Cuba is of older date than that of the annexation of Hawaii,—all the “manifest destiny” arguments apply to it much more manifestly,—all the strategic lectures we are so liberally treated to in regard to Hawaii are, in the main, but repetitions of the strategic lectures in regard to Cuba, delivered *usque ad nauseam*, to those who sleep in their graves for many a year. Are there no men within sight, eager to seize the first opportunity to rake all these venerable heirlooms out of the historical lumber-room, give them a fresh varnish, set them up and call upon the people to come, see, admire, hurrah and “go it”? Will unsophisticated people, then, not think that what was but yesterday accepted as sound and con-

vincing argument should to-day be allowed to pass as such? The better they have learned the lesson, that, as up-to-date patriots, they must consider Hawaii an exquisite relish, the more they will be disposed to roll Cuba as a sweet morsel under their tongue. *L'appétit vient en mangeant*. And the veriest tyro in politics cannot fail to discern how easily the actual condition of things in the hapless island may turn the perplexing Cuban problem into this channel, even without any aid from scheming politicians, and how many arguments it would furnish appealing strongly to certain generous and noble emotional tendencies, which are marked typical traits of the American people.

Attention had to be called, first, to Cuba, not because there is any reason to believe that a considerable number of Americans would deem the island the most desirable of all possible acquisitions. That has completely changed since slavery was buried beneath half a million graves. The next gust of annexation-wind is the likeliest to come from that quarter, because it depends largely on Spain and the Cuban patriots whether the annexation question is to come to a head; while as to all other possible acquisitions, no outside pressure could be brought to bear upon public sentiment. But while Cuba must be watched the closest, it would be a grievous mistake to suppose that no other points of the horizon need watching. Whenever men of annexation proclivities have been in our public councils, they have found no difficulty in putting something nice on the annexation counter, and, whatever they offered, they always had exactly the same plausible tale to tell in praising up their merchandise. A senator, hampered for time to compose a speech of his own on the necessity of taking Hawaii, could, for instance, read off nearly verbatim President Grant's message on the annexation of San Domingo, changing only the names; not one of the points that are material in the eyes of his brother-annexationists would be missing. The astounding impulse commerce and shipping would receive, the commanding military position, the isthmus transit, the voluntary offer by the government, the “yearning” of the people, the noble humanitarian ends to be attained, “the reliable information” about the unnamed European power anxious to secure the tit-bit and offering fabulous sums for it—it is all there.

Am I asked whether I think I could scare the American people by conjuring up historical ghosts, the San Domingo project having been shelved twenty-seven years ago? I ask in reply: Is that a guaranty that it will never again be taken down from the shelf, especially if the modernization of the Senate, which of late years, has been such a fruitful source of inspiring delight and duly appreciated blessing to the people of the United States, should go on as it promises to do? If Providence should bless San Domingo with another Baez, a second edition, revised or unrevised, of the special message of March 23, 1870, would by no means be an impossibility. The shelving of the Danish Islands is of a little older date, and, lo and behold, in June 1896, the platform manufacturers sprang on the unsuspecting National Republican Convention at St. Louis the following resolution: “By the purchase of the Danish Islands, we should secure a proper and much needed naval station in the West Indies”; and the junior senator of Massachusetts is reported to have a bill ready in his pocket, calling upon the party to make good its implied promise

to materialize this ghost, that has been laid these thirty years.

Take a warning. It is very rash to speak of ghosts as to annexation. You mistake your men if you suppose that when beaten off at one point, they will resign themselves to stay defeated as to that point.

Nor is that the only reason why there is no telling what surprises may be in store for us if we proceed upon the theory that they will ever be at the end of their tether. The sublimated mind of your full-fledged annexationist easily alights upon projects utterly baffling the puny imagination of common mortals in its wildest flights. The purchase of Alaska made the mouth of Robert J. Walker water for Iceland. And where does the spirit of our people draw a line to extravagance in this respect? Speaking in the House of Representatives on the bill making the appropriation for the Alaska purchase, Mr. Shellabarger, of Ohio, stated the reasons commending the treaty thus: "That we are a land-stealing people by nature, and that our propensities and our manifest destiny are to steal land, until our 'abutments,' as the gentleman (Donnelly, of Minnesota) says, shall be one on the Atlantic and the Pacific, and also upon the Arctic and the tropic seas. I know that argument appeals to our Fourth of July natures; I know how that is calculated to carry us off in that direction, and how I am and how everybody else is disposed to fall into this kind of thing. That is one thing we have to encounter in dealing with this matter. Our propensities as Saxons, our vanity as Americans, our pride as a great and progressive nation, our love of dominion, our lust of power, our self-glorification, our notions of what a great thing in diameter our country ought to be, and, above all, our ideas that it is as unpatriotic and out of fashion to hold that our future glory is not to be found in owning all the continents and islands between; all impel us to take this land." (Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 40th Congress, Append., p. 377.) The bold scoffer thereby provoked the following retort from his colleague, Mr. Spalding: "Sir, as an American citizen, and a Republican at that, I deny that any territory upon this western continent is to be deemed foreign to the government of the United States when it seeks to extend its limits. I believe that if anything under heaven be fated, it is that the American flag shall wave over every foot of this American continent in course of time. This proud Republic will not culminate until she rules the whole American continent and all the isles contiguous thereunto."

Here Mr. Pike, of Maine, interjected: "Including South America." Mr. Spalding continued: "Including South America by all means." (Congressional Globe, 2d. Session, 40 Congress, p. 3810.)

There you have the Simon-pure annexationist. He does not stop short anywhere, nothing is too mad for him; and, judging from the beating of the people's pulse in the past, he never doubts that he will find a goodly number of approving listeners, whenever he shall see fit to begin in good earnest the agitation for the next step forward. And with every inch of ground he and his soberer fellow-workers—I am tempted to say his soberer co-religionists—are allowed to gain, their strength and power of mischief increases. Who can gainsay that, seeing how the annexation speeches and editorials teem with the assertion that our having annexed so much is in itself irrefragable proof that we ought to annex more. They

know only too well how telling an argument that is with people, who are at no pains to let their thoughts go any further than they are led.

In spite of all I have said on this head, the danger of further annexations causes me the least alarm. I am enough of an optimist to hope that at the next occasion the level-headed men and women will not wait until the eleventh hour ere they step forward and speak out forcibly enough to arouse the people into asserting their sober second thought in so peremptory a manner that their official representatives cannot help minding it. I am infinitely less hopeful in regard to another side of the question, which is even of vastly greater import.

Captain Mahan says: "This is no mere question of a particular act, but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts." That is true, too true, and the scope of it is appalling.

Further territorial acquisitions are only an incidental feature of the irresistible temptation which the annexationists want to foist upon the United States by the annexation of Hawaii. It is of the most sweeping character, comprising all their relations as a political entity with the rest of mankind as politically organized. In a conversation on the question I had the other day, a gentleman formulated the issue thus: "Washington's warning counsels in his Farewell Address as to our international relations were conformable to the then condition, and the American people have done wisely to heed them thus far; now, however, we have outgrown this condition of things, the time has come to close the *provincial* era of our history (a leading daily paper of Chicago 'goes it one better,' substituting 'parochial' for provincial); henceforth it is our interest, and therefore our duty, to assert ourselves to the full extent of our actual power as a determining formative factor in all the world's concerns and problems." That sounds so plausible and touches so strongly two very resonant and most dangerous chords in the popular mind, that to consider the refutation easy is to concede the victory to the opponent.

Fisher Ames said, in his famous speech of April 28, 1796, on Jay's treaty: "The treaty alarm was purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less formidable. Objections that proceed upon error in fact or calculation may be traced and exposed; but such as are drawn from the imagination or addressed to it elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind after having been banished from it by truth." (F. Ames's Works, II., 47.) And in the Massachusetts ratification convention of 1788, he asserted: "Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which popular governments are destroyed." (ib. II., 7.) What is said in the first quotation of objections drawn from or addressed to imagination equally applies to arguments in favor of a measure.

The tremendous import of the truths embedded in these two sentences is fully realized by but very few. Our typical politicians hold them in utter contempt, if they are not as unintelligible to them as Chinese, though the reasons rendering imagination and enthusiasm so dangerous are obvious enough. Imagination is so formidable a foe, because "men are not to be reasoned out of an opinion they have not reasoned themselves into." (ib. II., 95.) Enthusiasm, however, is the offspring of imagination and sentiment. Democracies have so much more serious consequences to apprehend from it than peoples living under

a different form of government, because enthusiasm is intensely contagious, to resist the infection is to placard oneself as deficient in patriotism, and in democracies that is so momentous a charge that considerable nerve is required not to wince under it. To combat with the blandishments of imagination and the ardor of popular enthusiasm arrayed against one is, therefore, indeed to fight against heavy odds. And what can appeal more powerfully to the imagination, what is better calculated to arouse popular enthusiasm than this idea of taking a leading hand in all the great affairs of the world! We *can* do it, and therefore we *must* do it, partly for our own sake, because if we do not do it we will necessarily be distanced in the race for empire and all that it implies by the other competitors for the stakes, and partly because we have a great and glorious mission to fulfil.

Aye, sir, a great and glorious mission has been entrusted by Providence to the people of this republic, and they will become recreant to it if they listen to the voice of the tempter. They have thus far worked effectively at it by minding their own business. Now they are to hitch the republic to the entangled politics of the rest of the world so as to affect it in every way by their vicissitudes, whether they are really any of its business or not. Do you know what the heaviest incubus is lying upon the nations of Europe? Not emperors and kings, not aristocracies, not remnants of feudalism, not class distinctions, not lack of liberty, not the antagonism between poor and rich, but what the *international* history of Europe in the by-gone centuries has bequeathed to them. This heirloom forged by the past of that continent, is an unbreakable chain, dragging them, jointly and severally, all the while down and along by its terrible weight. This republic of ours came into being practically unencumbered by this chain, and this is one of the cardinal causes to which it owes the wonderful possibilities vouchsafed to it by Providence. Unbound by the past, it has been free to shape its course with a single view to its true interests, and it can remain thus free to the end of time. And now it shall renounce this inestimable privilege and insist upon having its arms, too, riveted to the curseful chain to satisfy a delusive megalomaniac itch!

Yes, delusive! They grossly deceive themselves who believe that this is the way to secure to our prestige the lustre, and to our influence the weight, to which our actual power entitles us. The longer we continue what they are pleased to term the provincial or colonial period of our history, the surer and the more these ends will be attained. The new international part we are urged to play would consume no inconsiderable part of our strength, and it would necessarily result not only in what would be deemed successes, but also expose us to occasional checks; for so overtopping our power is, after all, not yet, that we would always have it all our own way. On the other hand, leaving well enough alone, continuing to travel on the old roads that have conducted us to where we are now, our actual strength will and must go on increasing at least at the rate it has done heretofore. Prestige and influence, however, are not commensurate to the degree of meddlesomeness, but depend solely on the actual power, and our greater actual power could every time be brought to bear with its full weight on questions that are really our business, i. e., palpably affect, not our imaginary and fictitious but our real interests. We rest under no obligation, nay, we have no right to do

ought contravening these for any missionary purposes whatever. To do this would be pure and simple Quixotism, and Quixotism of an infinitely more vicious type than that of the noble knight of La Mancha; not a generous folly, but a portentous crime—a crime not only against ourselves, but also against mankind. For the stricter we are guided only by our own true interests, the more effectively do we serve the true interests of mankind.

Look at what our contemned provincial policy has accomplished already. An Austrian minister calls, in tones of deep distress, upon the nations of Europe to make a joint stand against the unbloody onslaughts of the transatlantic giant. He not only sets their tillers of the soil a-squirming, but is also changing with bewildering rapidity from a buyer into a seller of manufactured goods. Nor is this due solely to the unsurpassed natural resources of his patrimony and his ingenuity and industry. He can bend all his energies to the legitimate tasks of civilized man. They are condemned to spend an awful and ever-increasing part of their strength upon maintaining among each other the equilibrium of destructive force. This endless chain must ultimately put them at our mercy. No less an authority than Moltke has frankly confessed that it cannot go on so forever. No, it cannot, and primarily for this reason, that the economical competition of nations not weighted down by this endless chain must, in the end, become crushing. Thus the best interests of mankind are served in an eminent degree by the economical pressure we exercise upon the leading nations of Europe. For it steadily pushes them towards the line, where they must turn over a new leaf of their history, whether or no. It forces them to learn the lesson that, in the nature of things, the progress of civilization implies the conscious and systematic contending against and breaking down of whatever tends to the settlement of international questions by the sword. The history of the world has taken such a turn that, so far as we are concerned, in the long run much more coercive power is to be derived from peace, from whatever is calculated to keep us out of the broils of the world, than from any number of battleships we are able to build and to man, and from having our fingers in all the pies that are being baked in the hot oven of international politics.

As to the rest of the mission entrusted to us, I can say on this occasion only this much: It does not consist in going forth among all the heathen and preaching to them—in whatever way it may be—the gospels of our free institutions, but in staying quietly at home and teaching them by our example. Here is a vast enough field for missionary work to keep all our material, intellectual, and moral energies fully employed a good long while. It never pays and always comes with a bad grace to volunteer to sweep other people's houses, while in one's own abode many a nook and corner stands badly in need of a thorough cleaning. It will be early enough in the day to proclaim ours all brightness and gloss when the papers have been able to grant us a single week's respite in dinning into our ears the sorry tales of bossism, rotten municipal governments, corrupt and incapable State legislatures, unscrupulous and voracious corporations, etc., etc.

Are the tasks confronting us in all these problems not grave, difficult and urgent enough to deprecate whatever is calculated to divert the popular mind and the popular



conscience from them? And will this launching us into the troubled sea of an imperial international policy not have this tendency? Take heed, gentlemen. I do not hesitate to express my firm conviction that it is advocated by many an annexationist with a view to this end. And even if this charge be unfounded, there is no doubt that it will serve as an invaluable cover to the class of men so graphically described in the witty saying that they turn patriots after having failed in every other vocation; for these worthies are no fools, but know a good thing when they see it.

"Neither are England, Germany, France and Russia fools." I hear some annexationist interject, "and they are tumbling over each in their hot craving for what you contend must prove to us to be a prickly pear." Isn't it rather strange that the very men who are wont scornfully to hoot down the craven notion that the United States can learn from Europe valuable lessons of any kind whatever, are in this case so eager to bid us accept Europe as an authoritative model? I for one must beg to be excused, because, whether the European powers act wisely or not, their doings cannot serve us as an example, for they act under conditions that are not analogous to our own, but essentially different. England and Germany have a larger population than they can sustain. With them the question, therefore, is what can be done to secure the greatest benefit to the mother country from the outflow of the surplus. France has no people to spare and many reflecting and discerning men therefore do not doubt that her so-called colonial policy must turn out a losing venture and are satisfied that only vanity prevents the French people from realizing its folly. More than once France has brought down upon herself unutterable misery and woe by her inclination to consider "*prestige*" and "*gloire*" her paramount interests; *prestige* and *gloire* received a terrible blow by her last war with Germany, and the people give her rulers almost *carte blanche* as to measures which can be made to appear a burnishing up of the dimmed luster. Russia, while prone even more than we to confound size and greatness, is partly prompted in her policy of expansion by a desire resting upon a basis of sound statesmanship. Her usable coast line is greatly out of proportion to her vast expanse of territory, and she more especially stands sorely in need of ice-free harbors. Are we as to any one of the points mentioned in a similar situation? We have no surplus population, we have not to retrieve lost prestige and glory, we do not stand in need of more coast line or ice-free harbors. There is still room for uncounted millions within our borders, every year brings new revelations as to the boundlessness of our natural resources, and we command all the means necessary for securing all the benefits to be derived from peaceable intercourse with other nations, without having to resort to a hazardous change of our international policy.

If I were to stop here, I think I would have said enough to convince any American whose mind is still open to argument as to this question that the annexation of Hawaii would at best be a leap in the dark, which we as sensible people ought not to take, unless we are compelled to do it. And still by far the most momentous objections I have not yet even alluded to.

In the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence it is asserted that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." The Declaration of Independence is the nation's birth-certificate,

officially and authoritatively, stating its *raison d'être*. To eliminate this axiomatic assertion as the basic formative, nay creative principle of our whole national existence, is to give the lie to the generation of 1776 and our whole past history. The annexation of Hawaii as proposed would be such an elimination as to the islands. This the annexationists deny, pointing to the unanimous ratification of the treaty by the Hawaiian Senate. I ask: Is there one man among those of them whose reputation for honesty and candor is not a sham and a fraud, who could look another honest man square in the face and protest that he would not indignantly pronounce this justification a disingenuous evasion and a brazen quibble, if the Hawaiian government had originated with Englishmen and under English auspices, as it has originated with Americans under American auspices, and England were to adduce such a ratification as incontestable proof that annexation would rest upon the consent of the governed? This specious argument may do as a soporific drug for the uneasy conscience of honest annexationists, but it can never fool those who do not subscribe to the doctrine that the essence is of no consequence, if it can be covered up by ever so thin a veil of a plausible form.

Proof is not lacking that they know it well. Though the Senate discusses the treaty behind closed doors the Washington correspondents have no difficulty in sending a synopsis of the speeches to their papers. It is curious reading. I have not been able to quite make up my mind which of the several astounding statements deserves the palm. The guns "pointing straight" to the mouth of the Nicaraguan canal *in spe* over a couple of thousand miles have it, I said to myself, when I vainly tried to fathom the awful consequences of the development of artilleristic possibilities foreshadowed in this momentous announcement by so eminent a ballistic authority as a United States Senator cannot fail to be. But I again became doubtful, when I read that the natives were now, as they always had been, enthusiastic for annexation. Did the wicked press palm off a sensational romance upon the people with its stories about a deputation of natives gone to Washington to protest against annexation? Why did a prominent Hawaiian gentleman, who for years has been earnestly laboring for annexation, to my direct question the other day as to the attitude of the natives, give an answer in which the absence of the faintest intimation of such an enthusiasm was painfully conspicuous? Above all, if the natives have such an ardent longing to become Americans, why does no annexationist want to hear of the proposition to make annexation dependent on a free expression of the popular will? Except in cases of conquest this has been for about forty years the uniform practice in Europe, which we are so prone to decry as despot-ridden. We, the democracy par excellence, with the Declaration of Independence tucked under our arm, are now to abjure the old faith and proclaim by our act a new creed to this purport: "the consent of the governed" is a good enough thing, if you are the governed; a fool, who stickles about it, if his chance to govern depends on disregarding it.

This objection, the annexationists declare, is a shell sounding so loud only because it is hollow; the argument comes too late in the day; many a vast territory has been annexed by the United States without submitting the question to a popular vote; then nobody thought of making the charge that the underlying principle of the

Declaration of Independence was infringed, and even supposing that it could have been made nobody can contend to-day that any harm has come of it. To the uninformed and the unthinking this may seem a plausible refutation; in fact it has no basis whatever to rest upon. It is very clear that no precedent is to be found in the past history of the United States—provided we are not prepared to contest what all mankind has thus far been agreed upon, viz.: that every principle requires a reasonable application, because in practice every principle turns into a monstrous absurdity if it be run down to its last logical conclusions. The Indians inhabiting the Territories in question were savages, and as to annexation savages were never thought to come within the pale of the principle of the Declaration of Independence. The other inhabitants—Texas excepted, where, although the popular sentiment was not doubtful, a convention was called ad hoc—were comparatively few in number, occupying but a small part of the territory to be annexed, and the gift of American citizenship was deemed so valuable that the dispensing with their consent was morally justified. In Hawaii not a single savage is to be found, the islands are more densely peopled than the vast areas within the borders of the United States, and as to the gift of American citizenship—Ah, “there is the rub.”

Is the infringement of the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed to be confined to the question of annexation, or is it after annexation to go on indefinitely, permanently? The treaty is silent on this all-important question. President McKinley in his message recommends “the most just provisions for self-rule in local matters, with the largest political liberties as an integral part of our nation” to the Hawaiians. That sounds fair enough. But a ruthless sceptic arises who will not be satisfied with two lines of “glittering generalities;” he insists upon a bill of specifications.

Oh, say our annexationists, this is not the time to talk of details; in due time Congress will see to that and fix it all right. Excuse me. This *is* the time to discuss the details. After annexation it will be too late, for the annexation could not be undone, and great as the wisdom of Congress unquestionably is, it is not equal to the impossible; the discussion of the details, however, would prove beyond controversy that the given condition of things, the hard unalterable facts of the case render impossible a fixing of the practical details so as to make a satisfactory, nay even a tolerable job of it.

Who are the Hawaiians the President had in mind, when he penned the passage in his message which I quoted before? The Chinese are not included, for our laws brand them not only as unfit for citizenship, but even as a tainted race against which “the land of the free” must be closed altogether. How far the Japanese come under the same head may be a question that has as yet not been definitively passed upon by the courts; but that the ruling element in Hawaii views the class of Japanese settled in the islands in no other light than the Chinese is not disputed, and that on this point American public sentiment will fully sustain the ruling element of Hawaii admits of no doubt. The Portuguese, at least so far as the exercise of political rights is concerned, are not much more favorably looked upon by those who pose as “the Hawaiians.” Mr. W. N. Armstrong, of Honolulu, who I understand cuts quite a figure in the front row of the

annexation phalanx, goes to the length of denying their right to be counted among “the whites.” As to the natives or Kanakas, the Supreme Court of Utah, then a Federal tribunal, held in 1889 *in re Kanaka Nian*, as Mr. Lobingier points out to The Nation, that they cannot be naturalized. Congress could, of course, nevertheless confer the suffrage on them. But if this were done, what would the Hawaiians come to think of “the wisdom” of Congress? Mr. Armstrong says: “It must be distinctly understood that, besides ruling themselves, the whites must create a form of government through which they can rule natives, Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese, in order to prevent being ‘snowed under.’ That is, we need two distinct forms of government made up into one form; one for ourselves and one for aliens, who outnumber us.” (Quoted in The Nation, Dec. 2, 1897,) In parenthesis: make a note of it in your Webster or Century Dictionary that in Hawaiian English *natives* means *aliens*. Now, will it be denied that the Hawaiians are more competent to judge of the Kanakas than Congress? The wisdom of the Hawaiians, however, informs us that the Kanakas are utterly unfit to rule and must be ruled. Rev. Dr. S. E. Bishop, the son of a missionary and himself a missionary pastor, most emphatically endorses what Mr. Armstrong asserts on this head. The Kanaka, he says, “can no more rule than a child;” “in kindness he cannot be left to assert a right to control the vast public interest here.” (Quoted in The Nation of Dec. 9, 1897, from The Independent.)

Now, what does all this mean? The venerable gentleman last quoted concludes from it: “the question (of annexation) is one too broad and far-reaching for the mass of people to vote on with any intelligence.” Though there may be and probably is a good deal of truth in this, it does not warrant our trampling under foot the basic principle of the Declaration of Independence. But let it be granted for argument’s sake that it is conclusive as to the question whether a ratification of the tender of the Hawaiian governmental authorities by popular vote may be dispensed with. Would that be conclusive also as to the main question? Whether Dr. Bishop’s conclusion be right or not, it is most obviously not the only conclusion to be drawn from the facts I mentioned. According to their own statement the Hawaiians are less than 4,000 in a population of about 110,000 and the 106,000 “aliens” or non-“whites” are of such a character that we could not afford to merge the islands in the Union, though their strategic and economical value were a hundred times what it is claimed to be. That is what Mr. Armstrong and Dr. Bishop have demonstrated beyond the possibility of refutation.

In the discussion of the Alaska purchase Mr. Shellabarger and other opponents of the measure strongly dwelt upon the fact that this was the first time non-contiguous territory was to be acquired. It is still much too early to contend that experience has proved their apprehensions to be unfounded. The first war with a great naval power may easily bring a drastic vindication of their views. And even if it should fail to do so, that would by no means disprove the principle they contended for. Possibly Alaska would play no part of any consequence in such a war, only because the United States, in spite of its gold-bearing rivers and mountains, do not deem it valuable enough to warrant considerable efforts for its defense, or because the enemy thinks that all his forces can be em-



ployed to better purpose at other points. Whether territorial contiguity ought to be made a *sine qua non* for annexation, we, however, need not discuss to-day. To consider it of no consequence is certainly not the part of sound statesmanship. But let its import be rated ever so high, another question is indisputably of vastly greater moment. Homogeneity as to what is in the true and strict sense of the word essential must be deemed indispensable. If this degree of homogeneity does not exist at the time the annexation is contemplated, it must at least be certain that it can be brought about in a very short time. According to the unanimous testimony of the Hawaiians, this degree of homogeneity does not exist at present in Hawaii and the facts on which their statement rests prove that it cannot be brought about in the future, either near or remote. That ought to settle the question with every American, who does not let imagination and enthusiasm get the better of his sober reasoning.

Self government is to this gigantic republic of ours even more than its breath of life; it is its very structural principle. It permeates not only all its institutions, but also the whole thinking and feeling and all the habits of the people, which are even a greater force in a nation's life than its institutions. In the great ordinance for the organization of the Northwestern Territory, antedating the constitution, it was made the bedrock on which the new commonwealths must be reared that in the course of time were to become equal constituent members of the Union. The federal government under the constitution has never swerved from the path thus taken by the old Congress. Our laws teem with provisions bearing testimony to the fact that self government is the basic national principle, not merely granted as an inestimable privilege to the incipient new commonwealths, the inchoate states of the future, but also imposed upon them as an irrefragable obligation. A committee of the Hawaiian Senate, however, has informed us that "good government cannot be permanently maintained in these islands without aid or assistance from without." What is this if not a formal official declaration that Hawaii is permanently incapable of self government? Therefore, if we annex Hawaii we consciously insert into the nation's lifeblood a foreign body which cannot be assimilated.

Am I to be answered that so tiny a thing in so huge a body can surely not do much harm? Beware! A foreign body in the blood, which cannot be assimilated, will cause festering though it be never so tiny, and if it be not removed the festering will spread, slowly perhaps, but steadily. An incongruous element will be introduced into our institutions and, what is a hundred times more portentous, this will bring about progressing vitiation of the thinking and feeling and of the habits of the people. We will have two heterogeneous basic principles, two heterogeneous sets of institutions, two heterogeneous sets of ideas, sentiments, and practices; and, as with two different money standards, the baser will constantly encroach upon and irresistibly filch ground from the better. The eclipse of the republic will have set in. For a nation's vitality is not to be measured by area, wealth, and power; it primarily depends on the energy and momentum of the vital force in the harmonious regulation of all the vital functions. When the area, wealth and power of the Roman empire were the greatest, Fate, in pursuance of

the implacable laws governing the life of nations, tolled its death knell.

I, too, am a sincere and thorough believer in the "manifest destiny" of this country; I have only a somewhat different conception of what it is popularly understood to mean—different, but certainly not less lofty. Yea, I believe in its manifest destiny and I am thoroughly convinced that nobody can thwart or prevent its fulfilment—*nobody but ourselves*. The annexation of Hawaii, however, seems to me the first fatal step towards our frustrating its fulfilment. I have examined the question honestly and earnestly, bringing all the light to bear upon it furnished me by knowledge of human nature, by my observations during repeated extended sojourns in most of the leading countries of the world, by my studies of the history of mankind and especially of this country. Though the frankness with which I have stated the result to which I have come, is perhaps unpalatable, I trust it will be admitted that I have reasoned dispassionately. Aye, dispassionately, but not as if there was nothing in the problem to touch the emotional chords in my mind's harp. I feel strongly about it. My race will be run long ere the dire consequences which I expect will become very manifest. But I have taken my children along to become and remain Americans. How then can I help looking beyond my grave with deep concern and considering the issue as in a way of personal moment to me? How can you help doing the same? All the impressiveness I can command I wish to lay into my last word, addressing it to every one of you individually: *tua res agitur*, it is your cause I have been pleading.

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